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ABSTRACT
We build a bridge between the notions of Byzantine and Nakamoto
consensus by developing a theory of proof-of-work quorums. This
theory yields stochastic uniqueness of quorums as a function of
the quorum size, a security parameter. We employ the theory in
HotPoW, a scalable permissionless distributed log protocol that
supports finality based on the pipelined three-phase commit previ-
ously presented for HotStuff [50]. Additionally, we present a sim-
ulation framework for distributed consensus protocols, which we
use for evaluating the proposed protocol and variants with adver-
sarial modifications. Results show that the protocol can tolerate
network latency, churn, and targeted attacks on consistency and
liveness at small overhead compared to deployed systems.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Security protocols.
KEYWORDS
consensus, blockchain, quorum, proof-of-work
1 INTRODUCTION
The emergence of Bitcoin came as somewhat of a surprise to schol-
ars in distributed systems as well as in security [11]. Authors have
called the new composition of known concepts a “sweet spot” [48]
in the design space for protocols, and praised the complex way
the components are put together as a “true leap of insight” [39]
of Nakamoto [38]. Among many interesting details, the probably
most intriguing part is the way Bitcoin uses proof-of-work puzzles
to secure a distributed ledger.
The role of proof-of-work in Nakamoto consensus can be con-
templated in several ways. First and most intuitively, the compu-
tational puzzles can be interpreted as rate limit on new identities,
which discourage Sybil attacks [21] in a lottery for blocks and new
coins. Second, proof-of-work can be conceived as a game-proof
variant of a probabilistic back-off mechanism, as known from me-
dia access control in computer networks. It reduces the risk of col-
lisions when many nodes concurrently seek for write access to a
shared medium, the ledger. The first interpretation emphasizes the
throttling aspect, whereas the second stresses the competitive lead-
ership election and the source of randomness. Formalizations of
selected properties, which serve as interfaces to cryptographic se-
curity models, make yet another set of simplifications. For exam-
ple, Garay et al. [25] discretize time in rounds. All these models of
proof-of-work are helpful in some way, but arguably none of them
hits the mark.
Another widely held belief is that proof-of-work enables permis-
sionless systems, but the price to pay is eventual consistency. This
would imply that state updates are never truly final. Indeed, many
of Bitcoin’s security issues relate to the lack of finality, a technical
fact that even central banks seem to care about [2].
Against this backdrop, our research question is: Whether and
under which conditions can a permissionless distributed log based on
proof-of-work support finality? We claim that the answer is yes, by
proposing a protocol as positive example. Moreover, we explore
the conditions analytically and by simulation.
Our approach starts with building a theory of proof-of-work
quorums. As a side effect, this theory helps to clarify the role of
proof-of-workwith few assumptions, andwithout resorting to analo-
gies. The proposed protocol is inspired by two recent (in our opin-
ion) breakthroughs: HotStuff [50], which stands in the tradition
of Byzantine fault tolerance and will be deployed in Facebooks’s
cryptocurrency Libra [5], and Bobtail [9], which continues a line
of work optimizing Nakamoto consensus.
Both predecessors exploit the fact that consensus is found re-
peatedly to secure a distributed log. Distributed logs are the en-
abling concept for total order broadcast and state machine replica-
tion. They are sufficient as platform for arbitrary application (trans-
action) logic, including the ones of Bitcoin and Ethereum, two ex-
amples for widely adopted practical systems. Therefore, this work
can be agnostic about the application logic. It only studies how the
log can be implemented.
We make the following contributions:
(1) We develop a theory of proof-of-work quorums,whichmeans
that quorums are formed over votes generated by stochastic
processes. This theory gives us a closed form for the proba-
bility of quorum uniqueness (Section 2).
(2) We propose, specify, and explain HotPoW, a protocol that
finds consensus over a distributed logwithout requiring pre-
defined identities. Asymptotically, HotPoW scales at least as
well as practical blockchain protocols and much better than
Byzantine fault tolerance protocols. HotPoWrelies on proof-
of-work, but unlike deployed systems, our construction sup-
ports a three-phase commit logic. State updates (transac-
tions) are final after a predictable amount of time, and the
probability of inconsistency is bounded according to our
theory (Section 3).
(3) We build an evaluation framework that simulates the sto-
chastic process and the execution of HotPoW aswell as vari-
ants of it with adversarial modifications. Simulation results
show that the protocol can tolerate network latency, churn,
and targeted attacks on consistency and liveness at small
overhead compared to deployed systems (Section 4).
The final Section 5 positions our proposal in the broader design
space of consensus protocols and discusses possible extensions.
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2 PROOF-OF-WORK QUORUMS
Quorums play a central role for the design and analysis of Byzan-
tine fault tolerant (BFT) protocols. The typical Byzantine setting
assumes a set of n = 3f + 1 identified nodes, of which at most f
deviate from the protocol. If correct nodes vote at most once, a set
of 2f + 1 votes for the same value is called a quorum. Quorums
are fundamental to the safety analysis for their property of being
unique. The uniqueness may be violated in two situations, which
are typically ruled out by assumption:
BFT-1 More than n nodes vote.
BFT-2 More than f nodes vote more than once.
Practical systems avoid these failure modes by relying on preset
identities for all nodes.
Proof-of-work seems to enable a new kind of systems where
agents can join and leave at any time without obtaining permis-
sion from an identity provider or gatekeeper [38]. This difference
is often implied in the terms “permissioned” and “permissionless”.
The terminology in this paper differentiates between agents and
nodes. We use the term agent for entities participating in a dis-
tributed system: an agent can operate zero, one, or many nodes.
Colluding parties are interpreted as a single agent. The distinction
between nodes and agents is not important for BFT-style protocols.
It becomes relevant when nodes can be added or removed from the
network at runtime.
In this section, we introduce proof-of-work quorums and an-
alyze their uniqueness. In our framework, a quorum is a set of
votes where each vote requires a solution to a proof-of-work puz-
zle. Since proof-of-work is driven by a probabilistic process, the
uniqueness of quorums cannot be absolute. In contrast to theByzan-
tine setting, we have to consider three failure modes:
PoW-1 The total compute power of the network is higher than
assumed.
PoW-2 The adversary controls more than the assumed fraction of
compute power.
PoW-3 The probabilistic process results in a bad realization.
The failure modes PoW-1 and PoW-2 correspond to the Byzan-
tine failure modes BFT-1 and BFT-2. Our goal is to understand
the new failure mode PoW-3 and how it affects the potential non-
uniqueness of quorums.
We reduce proof-of-work to the property of generating random
events under resource consumption.
Definition 2.1 (Proof-of-work process). A proof-of-work process
is a stochastic count process where each count event assigns one
ability to vote (ATV) to one agent. Each ATV can be used by the
agent it is assigned to, to vote once for one value.
We adopt the notion of a quorum from the distributed systems
literature [37, 50], which calls a set of 2f + 1 votes for the same
value x a quorum for x . This guarantees uniqueness in the standard
setting with n nodes of which maximum f are faulty. Our setting
differs from the standard setting in that the assignment of voting
rights to agents follows a proof-of-work process. Hence, we need
a new way to reason about the uniqueness of quorums.
Definition 2.2 (n-quorum). We call a set of n votes for the same
value x an n-quorum for x .
From observing ann-quorum,we learn that at leastn ATVs have
been used. This is only possible if the proof-of-work process has
assigned at least n ATVs.
Definition 2.3 (Optimistic quorum time). The time at which the
proof-of-work process assigns then-th ATV is called the optimistic
n-quorum time. The optimistic quorum time is a random variable
TP,n . For a proof-of-workprocess P and quorumsizen it is formally
defined by
TP,n := inf{t ∈ R≥0 | P(t) ≥ n} .
The optimistic quorum timeTP,n describes the time at which an
n-quorum is first feasible. An n-quorum is only possible at TP,n , if
all assigned ATVs are used for the same value. This is why we call
it optimistic.
Since uniqueness is not guaranteed, we have to consider ambi-
guity. A quorum for x is ambiguous if there is another quorum for
y , x . Since each ATV can be used for at most one value, ambigu-
ous n-quorums are only possible when the proof-of-work process
has assigned 2n ATVs.
Definition 2.4 (Probability of ambiguity). For a proof-of-work
process P and quorum sizen we define the probability of ambiguity
(POA) as
poaP,n(t) := Pr
[
P(t) ≥ 2n
]
.
Remark (Bitcoin). The proof-of-work used in Bitcoin implies ex-
ponentially distributed time for finding a single puzzle solution.
The finder of a puzzle solution may propose a new block. The solv-
ing times for the block puzzles are independent and identically dis-
tributed with rate parameter λ = 0.1 solutions per minute. In our
terms, Bitcoin uses a quorum size of n = 1 and a Poisson process
Pλ for assigning the ATVs.
Lemma 2.5. The POA for the Poisson process Pλ is given by
poaPλ,n(t) = 1 − e
−λt
2n−1∑
k=0
(λt)k
k!
.
Proof. A Poisson process has the following properties [12]:
(1) Pr
[
Pλ (0) = 0
]
= 1,
(2) Pλ (t) − Pλ(s) ∼ Poisson(λ · (t − s)) for all s < t , and
(3) for n ∈ N and 0 < t1 < · · · < tn , the family of random
variables
{Pλ(ti ) − Pλ (ti−1) | 2 ≤ i ≤ n}
is stochastically independent.
According to Definition 2.4,
poaPλ,n(t) = Pr
[
Pλ (t) ≥ 2n
]
= 1 − Pr
[
Pλ (t) ≤ 2n − 1
]
.
By setting s = 0 in property 2 of the Poisson process and using
property 1, we conclude that Pλ(t) ∼ Poisson(λt). By evaluating
the cumulative distribution function of the Poisson distribution
FPoisson(k ; λ
′) = e−λ
′
⌊k ⌋∑
i=0
λ′i
i!
for k = 2n − 1 and λ′ = λt , we obtain the stated result. 
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Figure 1: The density of the distribution of the optimistic
n-quorum time based on the Poisson process Pλ with rate
λ = n/10 (minutes).
Lemma 2.6. The optimistic n-quorum time for the Poisson process
is Erlang distributed with shape parameter n and rate parameter λ,
in short
TPλ,n ∼ Erlang(n,λ) .
Proof. The time between two consecutive count events of Pλ
is exponentially distributed with rate parameter λ. The times be-
tween any two consecutive count events are stochastically inde-
pendent. The sum of n independent and identically distributed ex-
ponential random variables is Erlang distributed [12] with shape
parameter n and rate parameter λ. 
Corollary 2.7. The expected optimistic n-quorum time for the
Poisson process is
t¯λ,n := n/λ .
Proof. The statement follows from Lemma 2.6 and the defini-
tion of the Erlang distribution [12]. 
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the optimistic n-quorum
time for n ∈ {1, 2, 16} based on the Poisson process. We fix t¯λ,n to
10 minutes in order to make quorum sizes greater one comparable
to an ideal Bitcoin (n = 1). This is achieved by setting λ = n/10.
Figure 2 shows the POA for different quorum sizes as a function
of time. Again, we vary the rate of the underlying Poisson process
such that the expected optimisticn-quorum time is 10 minutes. Ob-
serve that the POA increases over time as the number of ATVs
grows monotonically. More importantly, the POA at the expected
optimistic quorum time decreases in the quorum size n.
In order to isolate the effect of n, we evaluate the POA at fixed
time t¯λ,n , which lends itself to a closed form.
Corollary 2.8. For the Poisson process, the POA at expected op-
timistic n-quorum time is given by
poaPλ,n(t¯λ,n) = 1 − e
−n
2n−1∑
k=0
nk
k!
.
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Figure 2: The probability of quorum ambiguity as a function
of time for quorum sizes n = 1, 2, and 16 and λ = n/10 (min-
utes) as implied by the Poisson process Pλ .
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Figure 3: The probability of quorum ambiguity at the time
t¯λ,n when we expect the first quorum as a function of quo-
rum size n.
Proof. Inserting Corollary 2.7 into Lemma 2.5 yields the stated
expression. 
Observe that the POA at expected optimistic quorum time is
independent of λ. This is useful as λ may measure the total com-
pute capacity in proof-of-work networks, which is not necessarily
known to each agent.
Figure 3 shows the POA as a function of the quorum size n at
the expected optimal quorum time t¯λ,n . We observe that the POA
decreases exponentially for increasing n.
Conjecture 2.9. The POA for the Poisson process at time t¯λ,n is
negligible in n.
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Figure 4: Pipelined three-phase commit to valuev on a hash-
linked list in HotStuff and HotPoW.
If we adopt the common definition of negligibility in cryptogra-
phy (i. e., asymptotic decline faster than any polynomial), then the
quorum size n is a security parameter.
Remark (Validation on Bitcoin). For Bitcoin parameters (n = 1, λ =
0.1), we get a POA at t¯λ,n ofp = 0.2642. This part of the theory can
be validated on historical data. We estimate the expected block de-
lay by averaging the differences between consecutive block time
stamps for the two years 2017 and 2018.1 The estimated average
block delay is tˆ = 9.52 minutes. The proportion of blocks that ar-
rived within tˆ after their second predecessor is pˆ = 0.2606. We
expect this estimate to be slightly below the theoretical value p be-
cause our historic Bitcoin data does not contain orphan blocks. We
can conclude that the theory applies in this case.
The intuition from this theory for protocol design is that larger
n-quorums reduce the probability of ambiguity and the variance
in quorum time. The exponential decay makes it conceivable to
choose parameters such that ambiguity becomes negligible in cer-
tain applications. This allows the protocol designer to use an ap-
proximate notion of uniqueness in a permissionless system.
3 HOTPOW
In this section, we propose a distributed log protocol that is secured
by a proof-of-work process (Def. 2.1) andn-quorums (Def. 2.2). Our
proposal is based on HotStuff [49, 50], which integrates BFT and
blockchain concepts. HotStuff achieves safety based on the unique-
ness of Byzantine quorums and a three-step commitment rule. We
transfer this construction to permissionless systems based on our
notion of approximate quorum uniqueness developed in Section 2.
3.1 Design Considerations
Algorithm 1 shows the proposed protocol “HotPoW”. We avoid
ambiguity by providing a self-contained excerpt of our draft im-
plementation in OCaml.2 We provide the formal interfaces of the
omitted modules in Appendix A. Figure 5 illustrates the interfaces
between the consensus protocol and other components of the soft-
ware stack. The complete implementation is provided as a supple-
ment.3
1Block time stamps were less accurate in the more distant past because the data field
was abused for other purposes. This is why we restrict the date range as indicated.
2We preferOCaml over pseudocode for the well-defined syntax and the enforced type-
checking, which supports clarity.
3The supplementary material can be found at https://anonfiles.com/Qf45M4rcn3.
3.1.1 Blockchain as Pipeline. HotPoW inherits from HotStuff the
idea of pipelining a three-phase commit protocol in a distributed
log (see Fig. 4). Blocks are values, onwhich the participants achieve
consensus consecutively. Since each block carries a quorum for
its predecessor, quorums are nested. A quorum for a block is also
a quorum on the quorum of the predecessor and a three leveled-
quorum confirmation of the second predecessor.
3.1.2 Proof-of-work. Alternatively, HotPoW can be interpreted as
an extension of Bitcoin [38]. We keep the main data structure – the
hash-linked list or blockchain – butmodify the rules for appending
new elements. Bitcoin requires a single solution to a proof-of-work
puzzle for each new entry. HotPoW requires an n-quorum for the
predecessor.
3.1.3 Vote. Votes are represented as triples (lnk, id, s), where lnk
is a reference to a previous block, id is a pseudonym of the voter,
and s is a solution to a proof-of-work puzzle, which creates the
ATV. These triples are pseudo-randomly mapped to integers by a
non-malleable hash functionHweight. The proof-of-work puzzle re-
quires a solution s such thatHweight(lnk, id, s) is small. This weight
function Hweight is implemented in Weight.weigh. Note that our
requirements for this hash function do not differ from Bitcoin’s
hash function.
3.1.4 orum. As defined in Section 2, an n-quorum is a set of n
votes for the same value. We represent such quorums as lists. Since
lnk is the same in all votes, it is omitted from the list entries. A list
L = [idi , si ] represents a valid n-quorum for lnk, if the following
conditions hold:
(1) |{(idi , si )}| = n,
(2) ∀ i < n : Hweight(lnk, idi , si ) ≤ Hweight(lnk, idi+1, si+1),
(3)
∑
n
i=1Hweight(lnk, idi , si ) ≤ n · t .
The difficulty of the proof-of-work challenge can be adjusted by
setting the threshold t . The third condition is a generalization of
Bitcoin’s threshold rule, which we adopt from the Bobtail pro-
tocol proposal [9]. In Algorithm 1, t and n are represented by
the constants quorum_threshold and quorum_size. The function
valid_quorum verifies quorum validity in the above sense.
We claim that this quorum implementation can be modelled by
a proof-of-work quorum based on the Poisson process Pλ as de-
fined in Section 2. We argue that our results on the probability of
ambiguity translate to our proposed protocol.
3.1.5 Leader Election. A quorum can only be formed at optimistic
quorum time (see Def. 2.3), when all agents vote for the same value.
We facilitate coordination on one value by electing a leader who
is responsible for proposing a new block. This election is based
on the proof-of-work quorum: the leader is identified by the first
vote. (Recall from the second condition of valid quorums that votes
are ordered by Hweight.) We require the id part of each vote to
be a public key, which ensures that leaders can authenticate the
block proposal with a digital signature. The functionality of dig-
ital signatures is encapsulated in the DSA module. The function
valid_block verifies whether a block carries a valid quorum and
was proposed by the associated leader.
3.1.6 Proposing. Each nodes tries to assemble a quorum with it-
self as leader. Each time a vote is delivered (on_receive) or found
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Algorithm 1 The HotPoW protocol
1 type quorum = (DSA.public_key * solution ) list
2 type block = {parent : block Link.t; height: int; quorum : quorum; body: payload ; signature : block_sig }
3
4 let valid_quorum lnk quorum =
5 let sum_of_weights lst = List.fold_left (fun acc (id , s) -> acc + weigh (lnk , id , s)) 0 lst in
6 List.length quorum == quorum_size
7 && is_sorted_and_duplicate_free quorum lnk
8 && sum_of_weights quorum <= quorum_threshold * quorum_size
9
10 let valid_block block =
11 match BlockStore.get blocks block.parent with
12 | Some block ' ->
13 block '.height + 1 = block.height
14 && valid_quorum block.parent block.quorum && App.verify block.body
15 && DSA.verify ~id:( fst (List.nth block.quorum 0)) (block.parent , block.quorum , block.body) block.signature
16 | None -> false
17
18 let rec commit_upto block =
19 if block.height > !executed then (
20 commit_upto (parent block) ;
21 state := App.apply block.body !state ;
22 executed := block.height )
23
24 let prefer block =
25 pref := block ;
26 vote_for := Link.hash !pref ;
27 commit_upto (parent (parent (parent !pref )))
28
29 let better block =
30 let leader_weight block =
31 let id , s = List.nth block.quorum 0 in
32 Weight .weigh (block.parent , id, s)
33 in
34 block.height > !pref.height || (block.height = !pref.height && leader_weight block < leader_weight !pref)
35
36 let propose ?replace lnk =
37 match PollClerk .lead ?replace votes lnk with
38 | Some quorum ->
39 let parent = BlockStore.get_exn blocks lnk in
40 let block =
41 let body = App.propose () in
42 block ~lnk ~quorum ~body my_secret
43 in
44 if better block then ( BlockStore.add blocks block ; prefer block ; Broadcast .send (Block block) ; true ) else false
45 | None -> false
46
47 let on_receive = function
48 | Vote ((lnk , _, _) as vote) -> (
49 PollClerk .count votes vote ;
50 if propose lnk then ()
51 else
52 match BlockStore.get blocks lnk with
53 | Some block ->
54 if block.height = !pref.height && PollClerk .( progress votes lnk > progress votes !vote_for ) then prefer block
55 | _ -> () )
56 | Block block ->
57 List.iter (fun (id, s) -> PollClerk .count votes (block.parent , id , s)) block.quorum ;
58 if valid_block block then (
59 BlockStore.add blocks block ;
60 if (not (propose block.parent )) && better block then prefer block )
61
62 let on_atv s =
63 let vote = (!vote_for , my_id , s) in
64 PollClerk .count votes vote ;
65 if not (propose ~replace :false !vote_for ) then Broadcast .send (Vote vote)
66
67 let work () =
68 let i = ref 0 in
69 while true do
70 incr i ;
71 if Weight .weigh (!vote_for , my_id, !i) <= vote_threshold then on_atv !i
72 done
condition 3) of a valid quorum
get predecessor block’
commit all preceding payloads
three-phase commit
check leadership & obtain valid quorum
block preference
receive vote
receive block
ATVs enable active participation.
Proof-of-work generates ATVs.
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work network
consensus protocol
application
prefer on_atv on_receiveBroadcast.send
App.propose & App.verify App.apply
Figure 5: Interaction between the protocol (HotPoW), the
application, and the network. Arrows denote information
flows and not necessarily call directions.
locally (on_atv), it is added to a vote store (PollClerk) that encap-
sulates the logic of assembling quorums with the own identity as
leader. This module ensures that only unique votes are added.
Whenever a quorum with the node as leader is possible, the
node assembles a new block and broadcasts it to the network (see
propose function).
3.1.7 Block Preference. Nodes prefer the longest chain of blocks.
In case of blocks with conflicting height, nodes enforce the lead-
ership rule by preferring the block where the smallest vote has
smaller weight (see better function).
When receiving a better block (on_receive), the node updates
the lnk value of its future votes to follow the longest chain of blocks
(see prefer function). The block preference is also revisited with
every received vote to support the lnk which has accumulated the
largest progress. Progress is measured towards the expected work
required to complete the quorum.
3.1.8 Voting. Each node actively participates in the quorum find-
ing process by computing ATVs (see function work). With appro-
priate choice of Hweight, the most efficient way to do this is by
iterating over the space of solutions and repeatedly checking the
weight of the vote. If the vote is small enough (≤ vote_threshold),
the node checks whether it can complete a quorum as leader
with the propose function. If no proposal is possible, the node
broadcasts the vote to the other participants. The choice of
vote_threshold depends on the performance of the broadcast net-
work. It can be adjusted dynamically within each round and en-
forced on the network layer to prevent congestion.
3.1.9 Application. We can implement arbitrary application logic
on top of the distributed log protocol [36, 45]. We assume that this
logic is hidden in the App module. Similar to deployed blockchain
protocols, the application proposes and verifies state updates as
implemented through App.propose and App.verify, respectively.
Specific to HotPoW, incoming state updates that our protocol con-
siders final are executed using App.apply.
3.1.10 Commit Rule. All payloads of blocks with at least three
quorum confirmations are executed (function commit_upto).
Three confirmations imply safety under the assumption of unique
quorums [49]. In the light of Conjecture 2.9, we claim that Hot-
PoW’s proof-of-work quorums become practically unique when
the quorum size is chosen large enough. If this holds, HotStuff’s
safety result translates to our proposed protocol.
HotPoW, like HotStuff, fixes the number of confirmations in or-
der to achieve finality. By contrast, Bitcoin lets users choose the
number of confirmations according to descriptive norms (six as
rule of thumb ≈ 1 hour), their preferences, and risk considerations
on the application layer (e. g., the value of transactions at risk).
Therefore, Bitcoin can reach eventual consistency at best.
3.1.11 Block. The central data structure of the protocol is a hash-
linked list of blocks. Each block persistently and verifiably stores a
hash reference to its predecessor (parent), a proof-of-work quorum
for this predecessor, a payload (body), and a proof of leadership
(signature). The block’s payload body is a state update to the ap-
plication implemented on top of the distributed log.
The references to parent blocks are established by the collision-
resistant hash function Hlink, which is implemented in the
Link.hash function. Nodes store valid blocks indexed by their ref-
erence using the BlockStore module.
3.1.12 Communication. The network layer is abstracted by the
Broadcast.send function and the assumption that messages are
delivered using the on_receive function, which handles both
votes and block proposals. There may be other forms of commu-
nication on the application layer (e. g., exchanging transaction in-
formation), which are not relevant in this context.
3.2 Incentives
It is possible to motivate participation in HotPoW by giving re-
wards to finders of proof-of-work puzzle solutions. For each vote,
the application logic can assign a reward to the vote’s id. Claiming
the reward for (lnk, id, s) depends on knowledge of the secret key
corresponding to id. This requires that the application logic sup-
ports some kind of transferable virtual asset that (at least partly)
fulfills the functions of money. Money is a social construct and
hence we abstain from engineering it here.
If money is assumed, one can start to reason about the reward
scheme. Bissias and Levine [9] argue that the combination of the
threshold rule and a constant reward per vote in a valid quorum
yields a fair outcome. HotPoW could adopt this scheme from Bob-
tail. However, finding the optimal reward is not trivial as the util-
ity of the reward outside the system may affect the willingness to
participate in the system and thereby make λ endogenous [20, 43].
This means that rewards have to be treated in combination with
the assumptions preventing the failure modes PoW-1 and PoW-2.
We are not aware of a single protocol analysis that offers a con-
vincing solution to this problem.
On a more general note, designing protocols like economic
mechanisms by incentivizing desired behavior sounds attractive
because there is some hope that the assumption of honest nodes
can be replaced by a somewhat weaker assumption of rational
agents [26, 30].Within this track, Badertscher et al. [3] present pos-
itive results for Bitcoin in a discrete round executionmodel and un-
der assumption of a constant exchange rate. However, many road-
blocks remain. Agents’ actions are not fully observable (e. g., infor-
mation withholding) and preference orders are not fully knowable,
hence rationality is not precisely defined. Side-payments (bribes),
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priority queue
ti ≤ ti+1
t0
t1
t2
t3
tn+1
tn+2
ATV
Broadcast
Deliver n − 1
Deliver n − 2
Deliver 0
ATV
simulation honest nodes
on_atv
on_receive
send
attacker node
on_atv
on_receive
send
random assignment
call
call
random assignment
latency/churn/failure
handle event schedule event
Figure 6: The evaluation framework simulates HotPoW
based on an event queue.
which cannot be ruled out, pose an insurmountable challenge for
mechanism design [10, 13, 32]. For distributed logs, which work
inherently sequential, this approach may even be thwarted by fun-
damental negative results on the existence of unique equilibria in
repeated games [6, 24]. For all these reasons, we refrain from deal-
ing with the mechanism design aspects and limit our contribution
to transferring Byzantine consensus to proof-of-work scenarios. In
other words, HotPoW supports incentives as a means to encourage
participation, but its security intentionally does not rely on incen-
tives.
4 EVALUATION
We evaluate our protocol proposal in a simulated network, simi-
larly to as it was done before for Bitcoin [15, 27]. Our simulation
framework is based on a central priority queue of events, where
keys represent points in time. There are three types of events: ATV,
Broadcast and Deliver. Events are scheduled by inserting them into
the queue. The simulation maintains state for all simulated nodes
separately. Node zero has a special role. It can be instantiated with
modified logic in order to simulate an attacker. All other nodes
follow the protocol. The main loop of the simulation takes events
from the queue and handles them by interacting with the nodes in
the following way (also see Fig. 6).
ATV. The simulation randomly and independently assigns an
ATV to a node. It executes the assignment by invoking on_atv on
the receiving node. Then, it schedules the next ATV with a ran-
dom, exponentially distributed time delta. This simulates a proof-
of-work process according to Def. 2.1.
The simulation does not preform actual work by setting
vote_threshold to the maximum weight. We set parameter
quorum_threshold =
1
4
· vote_threshold, (1)
which leaves sufficient safety margin below the theoretical ex-
pected value of 1/2. This avoids that votes with heigh weight are
dropped too early in the simulation, at the cost of increasing the
simulation complexity.
Broadcast. Broadcast events are scheduled whenever a node in-
vokes Broadcast.send. The simulation schedules Deliver events
for each node except the sender. In this step, the simulation injects
latency and simulates churn and leader failure.
Deliver i . The simulation calls on_receive on the i-th node
with the message previously given to Broadcast.send.
The simulation code is part of the supplementary material.4 All
upcoming results are based on simulations of 100 nodes over 1000
consecutive blocks. We aggregate the results of 20 independent ex-
ecutions using the arithmetic mean.
4.1 Robustness
We evaluate the robustness of the proposed protocol on scenarios
for latency, churn, and leader failure. In all simulations we check
for inconsistent committed state. Such forks only happen for ex-
treme latencies and small quorum sizes (see Figure 7). We conclude
that consistency is given under practical circumstances.
4.1.1 Latency. We model the effect of latency by injecting a ran-
dom time delay between broadcast send and message delivery. We
draw delays from an exponential distribution with fixed expecta-
tion independently for each node and delivery. Latency causes tem-
porary state inconsistencies. In these periods, nodes spend their
ATVs on extending superseded blocks, or even produce temporal
forks. Figure 7 shows the effect of latency on the expected time to
commit. We observe that latencies below 1% of the expected block
time (Bitcoin: 6 seconds) have no visible negative impact, while
latencies in the order of 10 % of the expected block time (Bitcoin:
60 seconds) delay a commit cycle by 20%. Since empirical anal-
yses [17, 19] and other simulations [27] suggest that the propaga-
tion time of blocks (≈ 500 KB) in Bitcoin is about 9 seconds, we can
argue that HotPoW tolerates practical latencies. In HotPoW, most
sent messages are votes. These are much smaller than a block and
the practical latency should be even smaller as well. This suggests
that HotPoW can run on the Internet with substantially lower ex-
pected block time than 10 minutes.
4.1.2 Churn. A certain fraction (churn rate) of nodes does not ac-
tively participate in the protocol for 10 times the expected block
time. During that time, the passive nodes can receive ATVs but do
not send or receive messages. Accordingly, the ATVs assigned to
passive nodes represent lost work and the time to commit is ex-
pected to grow linearly with increasing churn rate: if 50 % of the
nodes are passive, the time to commit is twice as long, independent
of the quorum size. Figure 8 shows the results of the simulation,
which support this claim.
4.1.3 Leader Failure. Truthful leaders may fail to propose blocks
due to network failures or targeted attacks on the network layer.
We model such failures by dropping each block proposal randomly
with constant probability (leader failure rate).
4The supplementary material can be found at https://anonfiles.com/Qf45M4rcn3.
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Figure 7: The effect of expected latency on the time to com-
mit. The latency is stated relative to the optimistic quorum
time (in small print for a quorum time of 10 minutes). Oc-
currence of permanent forks is indicated as red crosses.
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Figure 8: The effect of churn on the time to commit.
For traditional proof-of-work protocols, lost proposals imply as
much wasted work. In HotPoW, work can be reused for different
proposals. Honest nodes reveal at most one new vote with their
proposal. Accordingly, a lost proposal wastes at most the work of
one vote. We expect the protocol to becomemore tolerant to leader
failure with increasing quorum size. Figure 9 shows simulation re-
sults that support this claim. For perspective, the right end of the
graph simulates a situation in which an attacker can monitor all
nodes’ network traffic and disconnect nodes at discretionwith 50%
success probability. Still, the time to commit is almost unaffected
for large quorum sizes.
Overall, it seems that a reasonable choice of quorum size can ef-
fectively mitigate targeted attacks on the network layer. This leads
us to the discussion of attacks on the protocol layer.
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Figure 9: The effect of leader failure on the time to commit.
4.2 Security
Adopting the convention in the Byzantine setting, we assume two
agents. The total compute power λ is distributed over the agents
according to the ratio α . The attacker possess α ·λ compute power,
the honest agent the rest. We assume that the honest agent oper-
ates nodes that follow the protocol as specified, while the attacker
may deviate from the specification in order to reach his objective.
Zhang and Preneel [51] provide an evaluation framework for
proof-of-work cryptocurrencies that allows to evaluate for the dif-
ferent security aspects chain quality, incentive compatibility, sub-
version gain, and censorship susceptibility. They highlight that
security the analyses supplied with new cryptocurrency proto-
col proposals usually evaluate only a subset of these aspects. In-
terestingly, their evaluation based on Markov Decision Process
(MDP) models allow to conclude that all analysed alternatives to
Nakamoto consensus fall short on at least one of the four aspects.
The fact that the authors of [51] are aware of Bobtail, but do not
provide a MDP model for this protocol proposal, as well as private
communication with the authors of Bobtail itself indicates that a
full analysis of Bobtail/HotPoW-style protocols based on MDP is
not easily possible. We thus resort to informal reasoning and sim-
ulation and leave the MDP model for further work.
As mentioned, node zero implements the attacker in our simu-
lation environment. The allocation of ATVs to nodes is biased in
favor of node zero according to the choice of α .
4.2.1 Subversion Gain. Subversion gain mostly relates to double
spending, were the attacker wants at least one of the honest nodes
(the merchant) to act on inconsistent state. HotPoW supports com-
mits, hence we do not need to consider the possibility of rewrit-
ing the longer history nor the double spending of uncommitted
transactions. 5 Both problems apply to Bitcoin and are extensively
studied there [1, 13, 27, 31, 33].
5Every responsible application on a system with finality would wait until the commit.
HotPoW can be parametrized to reasonable commit times for economic exchanges
involving people. (High-frequency trading needs other architectures.)
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The only remaining attack strategy is splitting the network so
that the recipients of at least two double-spent transactions com-
mit to different states. This loss of consistency would materialize
in forks that require out-of-band resolutions.
In order to understand how HotPoW ensures consistency, it is
instructive to recall the block preference rule in Sect. 3.1.7. Assume
for a moment that nodes never update their value according to re-
ceived votes but blindly apply the longest chain rule. Then, an at-
tacker who becomes the leader could send different proposals to
each node. This would split the honest nodes’ compute power in
many small pieces and give the attacker time to form six quorums,
three per conflicting state. The probability of the attacker becom-
ing leader is at least α in each round. Therefore, blindly following
the longest chain rule exposes the system to a catastrophic attack.
Our block preference rule selects the value with the highest
progress among all received votes. Therefore, as soon as one vote
is received from an honest node, all honest nodes converge to a sin-
gle preferred value. As a result, the attacker would have to form six
quorums in the time the honest nodes get assigned a single ATV.
We argue that such an attack becomes infeasible for bigger quorum
sizes.
4.2.2 Censoring. The attacker wants to control the value on
which consensus is achieved for a longer period of time. This
means he has to be elected as leader in multiple (k) consecutive
blocks.
We assume that the leader election is independent of the previ-
ous rounds. We analyze the probability of the attacker becoming
the leader for a round by simulating a protocol execution and cal-
culating the ratio of committed attacker blocks. A naive attacker,
who follows the protocol as specified, leads a single round with
probability α . From the independence of rounds, we conclude that
censoring HotPoW for k consecutive blocks using the naive strat-
egy succeeds with probability αk .
Taking inspiration from the work on selfish mining [23, 34, 44],
we argue that an attacker can improve on the naive strategy by
withholding information. For Nakamoto consensus, withholding
information implies withholding complete blocks, such that other
miners spend mining capacity on an irrelevant part of the chain.
In HotPoW there exists a more granular type of information: an
attacker might withhold his votes. A censoring attacker would re-
lease his votes only when the release implies leadership. In prac-
tice, this means that a censoring attacker does not share votes, but
only proposes blocks. Using this strategy, the attacker can delay
the next quorum until the honest nodes can form one without the
attacker’s votes. This time window increases the attacker’s chance
of becoming the leader.
We implement this censor strategy (see Appendix A.3) and eval-
uate it in our simulation framework by instantiating the strategy
in node zero. Besides the number of forks, we count how many
of the committed blocks are proposed by the attacker node and
thereby estimate the probability of leadership per round. Forks do
not happen. Figure 10 shows the leadership ratio as a function of
the quorum size for different attacker strengths α . We observe that
this – to the best of our knowledge – optimal withholding strategy
is not a major security concern for HotPoW.
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Figure 10: The attacker’s share of committed block depend-
ing on quorum size and α ∈ { 150 ,
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2 } (bottom-up).
4.2.3 Chain ality and Incentive Compatibility. The prevalent
strategy for increasing the own share in blocks and rewards is self-
ish mining [23]. This attack is inherently connected with incen-
tives. Its basic idea is to withhold and strategically release blocks
in order to create an information asymmetry that allows to reap a
disproportional amount of rewards for the invested share of work.
This idea is not directly transferrable from Nakamoto consensus
to HotPoW for three reasons. First, the finality after three blocks
substantially limits the horizon of the selfish miner. Second, block
proposals are less valuable. They are not significant sources of re-
ward. Third, block proposals are less critical. In fact, block with-
holding reduces to the situation of leader failure. Since votes can
be reused, honest nodes can replace missing proposals very fast
(see Section 4.1.3). This makes proposals less rare events than in
Nakamoto consensus, limiting the strategic advantage of withhold-
ing them.
However, as we have argued in Section 4.2.2, it is a valid strategy
towithhold votes. Therefore, we analyze the effect of vote withhold-
ing on the distribution of rewards, assuming a constant reward
per committed vote, like in Bobtail [9]. While the naive strategy
yields a share of α of the rewards, the attacker’s goal is to max-
imize the number of votes he contributes to each quorum. Since
only the leader can decide which votes are included in a proposed
quorum, the first step of optimal vote withholding is to increase
the chance of becoming the leader. This, in turn, can be achieved
by withholding votes! The circularity indicates that the attack can
be best approximated with the censoring strategy.
Figure 11 shows simulation results on how the strategy, α , and
the quorum size affect the share of attacker votes committed to the
chain. Interestingly, the censor receives fewer rewards (in partic-
ular for small quorum sizes) than honest nodes and naive attack-
ers, indicating a dilemma between paying for becoming the leader
and capitalizing the power of leadership. The tradeoff is visible by
comparing Figures 10 and 11. It points to a potentially interesting
economic argument that falls beyond the scope of this work. The
tradeoff also appears for the so-called “proof withholding” strategy
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Table 1: Storage overhead of HotPoW consensus.
Quorum size Probability of ambiguity Block header
n at expected quorum time (bytes)
1 0.2642 72
2 0.1429 112
16 0.0003 672
64 1.2 × 10−12 2.6 k
256 4 × 10−45 10 k
in Bobtail [9], which shares essential properties with the censoring
strategy in HotPoW.
4.3 Overhead
HotPoW requiresO(n)messages per block, where n is the quorum
size. It is constant in the number of nodes, like Bitcoin. The main
differences that may matter is the size of the block header, since
HotPoW requires to store the complete valid quorum containing n
proof-of-work solutions. This overhead is relevant because it must
be replicated in all nodes who want to verify the integrity of the
blockchain in the future.
Table 1 shows the storage overhead per block as a function of n
and the associated probability of ambiguity at expected optimistic
quorum time (Corollary 2.8). We conservatively assume a public
key of 256 bits and a proof-of-work solution of 64 bits. (Bitcoin
shortens public keys to 160 bits and uses proof-of-work solutions
of 32 bits.) Even in the most robust case analyzed (n = 256), the
overhead is about 1 % of Bitcoin’s current block size. In this case,
falsely accepting a quorumas unique ismuch less likely than guess-
ing a 128-bit key in one attempt. We argue that the benefits of the
protocol outweigh its storage costs.
5 DISCUSSION
This section positions HotPoW in the design space of consen-
sus protocols, reflects on our assumptions and limitations, and
sketches promising avenues for future work.
5.1 Design Space
Weobserve a huge amount of proposal for distributed log protocols
in the wild. We do not claim to know all of them and we do not
attempt to provide a complete map of the design space, since other
works have specialized on this task [4, 14]. Instead, in the following
we relate HotPoW to some close relatives on a limited number of
dimensions (see Table 2).
Order of target size. Early BFT protocols were designed with a
small target size in mind. PBFT [16] is a prominent example. It
is proven secure under the typical Byzantine assumptions BFT-1
and BFT-2. PBFT requires multiple rounds of voting for reaching
consensus on a single value. The O(n2) complexity of each com-
munication round makes is practical for only a limited number of
nodes n.
HotStuff is secure under the same assumptions as PBFT [49],
but increases the rate of confirmed values to one per round of
voting. Its key idea is to pipeline the commit phases of iterative
consensus (recall Fig. 4). Additionally, it reduces communication
complexity to O(n) by letting all nodes communicate with via the
current leader instead of a broadcast network. The two changes
make HotStuff practical for larger networks. However, all n nodes
must actively participate (send messages) during each round.
Subset forms committee. Protocols designed with even larger
scale in mind reduce communication complexity by limiting the
number of active nodes per round. These protocols shift power be-
tween terms by electing committees. The subset of nodes that are
part of the committee actively communicate by sending messages.
Other nodes passively observe until they become part of a commit-
tee.
In Bobtail [9] and HotPoW, multiple proof-of-work puzzles are
solved during each term. Consequently the committee size can be
greater than one. Bitcoin can be interpreted as corner case with
committee size one. During each term (block interval), one node –
the finder of the block – broadcasts a message.
Also proof-of-stake protocols follow this approach, with com-
mittee membership being tied to the possession of transferrable
digital assets (stake).
Permissioned. As stated earlier (Sec. 2), BFT-1 can only be sat-
isfied by restricting access to the network based on identities
assigned by an external identity provider or gatekeeper. Conse-
quently, protocols relying on this assumption are permissioned on
the network layer.
Proof-of-stake internalizes the gatekeeping functionality by re-
stricting access to the committee based on the distribution of stake.
While participating as node may happen without permission, ac-
cess to the committee is still permissioned.
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Table 2: A view on the design space for distributed log protocols.
order of subset forms permissioned resource binding finality
target size committee network committee BTP BTI
(timing, Fig. 12)
PBFT 10 X X
HotStuff 100 X X
Proof-of-stake 1000 X X X
Bitcoin 1000 (X) X
Bitcoin-NG 1000 (X) X X
Bobtail 1000 X X
HotPoW 1000 X X X
bound to proposal (BTP)
timeresource binding
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timeresource binding
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competition
Figure 12: Resource binding canhappen for concrete propos-
als or for identifiers which are later used to sign a proposal.
In proof-of-work systems any agent can join and leave the net-
work and has a (fair) chance of becoming committee member with-
out obtaining permission from a gatekeeper.6
Resource binding. Proof-of-work can be seen as a commitment
of resources to a value. Creating a proof-of-work for a specific
value consumes resources. The resources are bound to a value.
Typically, these values are chosen locally on each node. Fresh-
ness is guaranteed by including a reference to recent puzzle solu-
tions in the value. Only completed commitments are shared and
can the resource binding can be verified by others.
We distinguish whether the resources are bound to a proposal
(BTP) for an upcoming value, or whether they are bound to an
identifier (BTI) used for entering the committee.
Bitcoin uses BTP. Nodes form a proposal for the next block lo-
cally and then start to solve a proof-of-work for this proposal. If
they are successful in finding a puzzle solution, they share their
proposal. This process is depicted in the upper half of Figure 12.
By contrast, HotPoW uses BTI. Nodes choose an identifier and
try to solve a proof-of-work for this identifier. If they are successful
in finding a puzzle solution, they form a vote or proposal and broad-
cast it. This alternative order of events in depicted in the lower half
6We ignore the role of the supply chain for puzzle solving equipment.
of Figure 12. These identifiers can be ephemeral pseudonyms and
are not necessarily linkable to the identity of the agent.
Bitcoin-NG [22] combines both approaches. The distributed log
of Bitcoin-NG has two kinds of entries. So-called key blocks can be
appended by solving a BTP-style proof-of-work. They contain an
identifier of the leader. This identifier can then be used to append
microblocks to the log until the next key block emerges.
Finality. Bitcoin’s lack of finality opened many opportunities
for attacks. So far, according to conventional wisdom, it has been
accepted as the price of a truly permissionless system. The high
risk of inconsistency due to the stochastic nature of proof-of-work
precluded a convention to commit after a fixed number of blocks.
HotPoW challenges this view by proposing a way to reduce the
stochastic uncertainty in proof-of-work quorums. These quorums
can serve as basis for HotStuff’s innovative commit pipeline in a
permissionless system.
Other important developments not included in Table 2 can be
broadly divided into two strands. First, many proposals seek to
overcome the scalability issues of Bitcoin by running permissioned
consensus protocols on identities established on an underlying per-
missionless blockchain [18, 35, 42]. HotPoW differs by integrating
both layers into one. This removes the need for cross-layer opti-
mization. Second, some proposals replace the linear data structure
of the distributed log with more general directed acyclic graphs
(DAGs) [41, 46, 47]. This promises higher scalability and faster first
confirmation in latent networks at the cost of imposing different re-
quirements on the application layer. For example, Fruitchain [41]
recognizes solutions to hard and easy puzzles. It hides the DAG
from the application layer by not allowing ‘fruits’ to carry state
updates. A commonality with HotPoW and Bobtail [9] is the idea
to partition work into smaller units and increase the share of work
actually used to secure the authenticated data structure. In the sim-
plest form, adopted in Ethereum, referencing orphaned blocks en-
sures that the resources bound in them are not lost.
5.2 Reflection on Assumptions
We presented a protocol that achieves finality in a permissionless
setting under axiomatic exclusion of the failure modes PoW-1 and
PoW-2, and the acceptance of a small failure probability. The as-
sumption on PoW-1 and PoW-2 are also made for security proofs
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for Bitcoin [25, 40]. Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether
the assumptions are reasonable.
Excluding PoW-1 corresponds to assuming a fixed, network-
wide compute power λ.We cannot expect this to hold in the permis-
sionless setting where agents can add and remove nodes at their
willing. We observe in practice that a control loop, like Bitcoin’s
difficulty adjustment, can compensate changes of λ up to a certain
degree. Sudden changes in compute power might be problematic.
We argue that proof-of-work quorums are beneficial in this case:
increasing the quorum size while keeping a fixed block delay im-
plies a higher ATV rate. Accordingly, more ATVs can be observed
per time, which enables a more accurate and faster estimation of
λ.
The same effect can be used for detecting network-level attacks,
such as eclipse and splits (see Appendix B). This is relevant in the
context of the CAP theorem [29], which tells us that every dis-
tributed system has to sacrifice one out of consistency, availability
and partition tolerance. HotPoW, as presented, favors availability
over consistency. It does not implement a mechanism for detect-
ing network splits, even though it is possible at high confidence
for big quorum sizes. The trade-off could be changed in favor of
consistency. If a split is detected, the protocol withholds commits
(and may notify the application layer in order to trigger out-of-
band resolutions).
The second failure mode PoW-2 causes severe trouble and is
hard to argue against. An agent cannot rule out the rest of the net-
work collaborating against him. We are not aware of an argument
for α being bound to a constant below 50% for any proof-of-work
protocol. In fact, >50 % attacks have been launched against smaller
instances of Nakamoto consensus in practice.
5.3 Future Work
The results presented so far can serve as starting points for future
research. We outline the in our opinion most promising directions.
Simulation at global scale. We have evaluated HotPoW on an
ideal broadcast network with simulated latency. A suitable exten-
sion would be to evaluate it on a peer-to-peer network with more
realistic latencies, ideally at internet scale. The parameter of inter-
est is the shortest practical time to commit, which tells us which
kinds of applications HotPoW could support in principle.
Block header compression. In Sect. 4.3, we assumed that each
vote stored within a quorum contains a 256 bit public key. For big-
ger quorum sizes it might be worth exploring whether this over-
head can be reduced. HotPoW could be extended to make the votes
id short lived. Theoretically, the identifiers have to be used only
once for claiming the reward, or twice in case of leadership. This
gives room to consider shorter public keys or even one-time signa-
ture schemes.
Security proofs. So far, we have evaluated HotPoW against a
small number of attacks known from existing systems. There
might be modifications of the discussed attacks or even unrelated,
new attacks that HotPoW does not handle as well. Such threats
should be ruled out by constructing a security proof in a suitable se-
curity model, as it was done for Bitcoin [25, 40]. Also the assumed
generalization of HotStuff’s properties on proof-of-work-quorums
could be supportedwith formal arguments. Finally, a proof of Con-
jecture 2.9 would tie proof-of-work quorums with security param-
eter n more closely to common cryptographic security models.
MPD model. Zhang and Preneel [51] show that security proofs
for many recent cryptocurrency protocols fall short in addressing
all relevant security aspects (see Section 4.2). They provide a frame-
work for evaluation and comparison of proof-of-work protocols
that is based on modelling the execution as Markov decision pro-
cess. The design of such a MDP model for HotPoWwould allow to
gain confidence in the security of our proposal.
HotPoW-NG. Bitcoin-NG [22] separates leadership election
from the proposal of new blocks, not much different to HotPoW.
Bitcoin-NG allows the current proposer to sign intermediate mi-
croblocks in order to increase transaction throughput. It might be
possible to transfer this idea to HotPoW.
HotPoS. In its current state, HotPoW sources ATVs in proof-of-
work puzzles. It might be possible to replace this mechanism with
puzzles of the style of Algorand [28]. This would give a proof of
stake version of HotPoW: HotPoS.
HotPoX. Finally, it might be worthwhile to explore if the the-
ory in Sect. 2 can be generalized to proof-of-work puzzles with dif-
ferent (and possibly not independent) distribution of solving time.
This would connect to the literature on proof-of-work puzzles with
special properties, verifiable delay functions, and possibly useful
proof-of-work.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
We understand HotPoWas a positive example to support our claim
that it is possible to build permissionless distributed logs based on
proof-of-workwith finality, as stated in our research question. The
question is tentatively answered until HotPoW is broken.7 We in-
vite the community to prove our claimwrong, and provide running
code in the supplemental material to facilitate this task.8 It is not
safe to use this code in systems dealing with real values.
Regardless of whether our claim is true or false, the theory of
quorums on stochastic processes may find applications elsewhere.
Since it entails Nakamoto consensus as special case, it contributes
to a better understanding of the role of proof-of-work in known
systems that “work in practice, but [so far] not in theory” [11].
If our claim holds, we have found a way to build permissionless
distributed ledgers with finality based on proof-of-work. However,
proof-of-work is a very wasteful way of establishing consensus. It
should be avoided whenever possible. Only if there is no alterna-
tive to proof-of-work, HotPoW should be considered as a replace-
ment for Nakamoto consensus.
A PROTOCOL DEPENDENCIES
We document relevant parts of the implementation which were
omitted in Sect. 3.
7Another possibility is a formal proof of correctness. Unfortunately, we are not aware
of tools and techniques that support reasoning on protocols of this complexity.
8The supplementary material can be found at https://anonfiles.com/Qf45M4rcn3.
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A.1 Primitives
HotPoW uses the primitives DSA, Broadcast, Link and Weight.
DSA. A digital signature algorithm that implements the follow-
ing interface. Our simulation uses an insecure dummy implemen-
tation. In practice one should use something like RSA or ECDSA.
module DSA : sig
type public_key
type private_key
type 'a signature
val signature : secret: private_key -> 'a -> 'a signature
val verify : id:public_key -> 'a -> 'a signature -> bool
val generate_id : unit -> public_key * private_key
val string_of_id : public_key -> string
val int_of_id : public_key -> int
end
Broadcast. Nodes need a way to share their votes and block pro-
posals. In case of our simulation, communication between nodes is
handled within the same process. In practice, this should act simi-
lar to Bitcoin’s peer-to-peer network.
module Broadcast : sig
type message
val send : message -> unit
end
Link. A collision-free hash function used for linking blocks.
Our simulation derives an implementation of this interface from
the (cryptographically insecure) polymorphic hash function of the
OCaml standard library. In practice one might use something like
SHA2 or Keccak/SHA3.
module Link : sig
type 'a t
val hash : 'a -> 'a t
val equal : 'a t -> 'a t -> bool
end
Weight. The hash function used for implementing the proof-of-
work process. We require that for any fresh input, the output is
uniformly distributed on the interval [0, max_weight]. It must be
infeasible to bias the output by carefully choosing the input. The
only way of finding inputs with small outputs must be trial and
error. Our simulation uses the insecure hash function provided
with the standard library. In practice, this must be replaced with a
hash function suitable for proof-of-work. A suitable default is dou-
ble SHA2 (deployed in Bitcoin), but more elaborate options [7, 8]
might be considered.
module Weight : sig
val weigh : 'a -> int
val max_weight : int
end
A.2 Application
Alg. 1 assumes that the application logic is encapsulated in the App
module. The type App.transition corresponds to the type of the
block body (payload).
module App : sig
type transition
type state
val initial : state
val apply : transition -> state -> state
val propose : unit -> transition
val verify : transition -> bool
end
A.3 Censoring Attacker
In Sect. 4.2.2, we described a censoring strategy based on withhold-
ing votes. The difference between this strategy and Alg. 1 is only
one line (65):
- if not (propose ~replace: false !vote_for) then Broadcast.send (Vote vote )
+ ignore (propose ~replace: false !vote_for)
In order to maximize the number of own votes committed to the
chain, the censoring attacker additionally adapts PollClerk.lead
to prefer own votes over the votes of others when forming quo-
rums. This modification is given in the supplementary material.
A.4 Helper Modules
Algorithm 1makes use of themodules BlockStore and PollClerk
without explicitly stating what they do. Both implement data struc-
tures with special access functions needed by HotPoW. We pro-
vide their interfaces and descriptions here. We refer the interested
reader to the implementation, which is provided as supplementary
material.9
module PollClerk : sig
(** Helper module for counting votes and assembling quorums. *)
type t
val count : t -> vote -> unit
(** [count t vote] adds [vote ] to the store . *)
val lead : ? replace:bool -> t -> block Link .t -> quorum option
(** [lead t lnk] checks for leadership on [lnk] and returns corresponding
quorum. Per default , this does leader replacement by omitting small
foreign votes . The leader replacement can be deactivated with
[~ replace: false ]. *)
val progress : t -> block Link .t -> int
(** [ progress t lnk] maps the progress on a quorum for [lnk] to integer
scale for comparison. The higher the output , the more likely it is that
[lnk] will make it. *)
val gc : keep :( block Link.t -> bool) -> t -> unit
(** Garbage collection. [gc ~keep t] drops all votes for references from [t],
for which [keep lnk] yields [false ]. *)
val create : qsize :int -> qthreshold:int -> DSA. public_key -> t
(** [ create ~ qsize ~qthreshold id] sets up a vote store that produces quorums
for the given [id]. *)
end
module BlockStore : sig
(** This provides a mechanism for storing and retrieving objects ( blocks)
indexed by their reference hash. *)
type 'block t
val get : 'block t -> 'block Link.t -> 'block option
(** [get t lnk] return [ Some block ] with [Link.hash block = lnk] or [None ]. *)
val get_exn : 'block t -> 'block Link.t -> 'block
(** Similar to {!get} but raises [ Not_found] instead of returning an option.
*)
val add : 'block t -> 'block -> unit
(** [add t block ] adds [ block ] to store [t]. *)
val create : unit -> 'block t
(** [ create ()] creates an empty block store . *)
val mem : 'block t -> 'block Link.t -> bool
(** [mem t lnk] checks whether the [t] contains a block with reference [lnk].
*)
val gc : keep :('block Link.t -> 'block -> bool) -> 'block t -> unit
(** Garbage collection. [gc ~keep t] drops all blocks from [t], for
which [keep lnk b] yields [false ]. *)
end
9The supplementary material can be found at https://anonfiles.com/Qf45M4rcn3.
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Table 3: Time until eclipse can be detected at confidence p =
0.001 (relative to expected block time).
quorum size 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256
time 6.91 3.45 1.73 0.86 0.43 0.22 0.11 0.05 0.03
B DETECTING ATTACKS
Each vote is linked to one ATV. By assumption (Sect. 2), the time
between every two ATVs is exponentially distributed and ATVs
happen at rate λ. A fully interconnected node in a network with-
out adversary can expect to learn of new votes (and own ATVs
combined) at the same rate λ. A node can test the hypothesis of
being attacked (eclipsed) based only on observing the incoming
votes. Table 3 shows after what amount of time (relative to block
time), during which a node did not receive a single vote, this node
can rule out natural behaviour at confidencep = 0.001.We observe
that bigger quorums sizes increase the detectability of eclipse at-
tacks. With a quorum size of 128 an eclipsed node could react after
20 % of the expected block time, while for Bitcoin it takes almost 7
times the expected block time.
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